The famous Braess paradox describes the following phenomenon: It might happen that the improvement of resources, like building a new street within a congested network, may in fact lead to larger costs for the players in an equilibrium. In this paper we consider general nonatomic congestion games and give a characterization of the maximal combinatorial property of strategy spaces for which Braess paradox does not occur. In a nutshell, bases of matroids are exactly this maximal structure. We prove our characterization by two novel sensitivity results for convex separable optimization problems over polymatroid base polyhedra which may be of independent interest.
Introduction
In a congestion game (as introduced by Rosenthal [36, 37] ) there is a finite set of players that compete over a finite set of resources. A pure strategy of a player consists of a subset of resources, and the congestion cost of a resource depends only on the number of players choosing the same resource.
Nonatomic congestion games model the interaction of a large number of players with the property that the strategy choice of each player has only a negligible effect on the others. In these kinds of model, it is usually assumed that there is a continuum of players partitioned into populations and the strategy space available to a player of a population comprises a population-specific set of allowable subsets of resources. A pure Nash equilibrium of a nonatomic congestion game is a strategy distribution from which no player can unilaterally select a different subset of resources with strictly lower cost. Here, the cost of a subset is simply defined as the sum of the resource costs. Nonatomic congestion games have a wide range of applications, for example, they are used to model habitat selection in biology (cf. Milinsky [29] ), queueing systems (cf. Korilis et al. [25] ) and packet routing in telecommunications (cf. Qiu et al. [34] ). Perhaps the most famous example of a nonatomic congestion game appears in the traffic model of Wardrop where the resources form a (directed) graph and a population corresponds to a continuum of players that want to travel from an origin to some destination in the graph. In this case, the set of allowable subsets corresponds to the set of origin-destination paths and the costs represent travel times. In a Wardrop equilibrium (cf. Wardrop [47] ) each player selects a path of minimum cost. The existence of Wardrop equilibria and their characterization via pure Nash equilibria of an associated non-cooperative game (assuming continuity of cost functions) has been established since the early 50's, see Beckmann et al. [3] . In [3] , the authors show that a strategy distribution is a Wardrop equilibrium if and only if it is a global minimum of an associated separable convex function known as the Beckmann potential.
Braess Paradox
In this paper we will study a well-known phenomenon originally discovered in the context of the Wardrop routing model: Dietrich Braess, a German mathematician, published in 1968 a paper [5] (see also the paper [6] ) in which he showed that adding a new arc to a transportation network might actually degrade the performance of the resulting Wardrop equilibrium. Here the performance is measured in terms of the total travel time experienced by players in a Wardrop equilibrium. Let us briefly recall an example of the Braess paradox. As depicted in Fig. 1 , there is a single-source single-destination network and we want to send one unit of flow from s to t. On the arcs, we indicate the travel cost per unit as a function of the congestion; in particular, 1 means that the the travel cost per unit is one independent of the congestion, and x signifies that the travel cost per unit is equal to the congestion of the arc. In the left network, the unique Wardrop flow sends evenly one-half units along the upper and lower path, respectively. This flow is also optimal having total cost of 3/2. Suppose that a new fast road is built (latency function is reduced from ∞ to 0) connecting the two nodes in the middle, as shown in the right-hand-side figure. The new (unique) Wardrop equilibrium sends its flow entirely along the zig-zag path having a total cost of 2 and each player perceives a strictly larger path latency of 2. This example shows the paradoxical situation that a network infrastructure improvement may actually hurt the resulting travel times of the new Wardrop equilibrium. Let us now consider another type of Braess paradox that may arise via demand reductions. Note that demand reductions frequently occur in practice, e.g., if commuters switch to the public transport system in case a new railway, tram or underground line has been built. Consider the example in Fig. 2 . There are three populations N = {1, 2, 3} that want to travel from s i to t i , for i = 1, 2, 3. In the original instance the demands are
The resulting unique Wardrop equilibrium x * routes the flow of population 1 along the direct edge (s 1 , t 1 ). Thus, the total cost of x * can be calculated as C(x * ) = 1·2+2·2+M ·0 = 6. Suppose we decrease the demand of population 2 from 2 to d 2 = 0. In the new (unique) Wardrop equilibriumx, the flow of population 1 will be sent entirely on the path (s 1 , t 2 , t 1 ) with a total cost of C(x) = M + 2. It follows that for M > 4, the reduction of demand may actually hurt the total cost.
Our Results and Techniques
We study nonatomic congestion games and investigate the Braess paradox for arbitrary set systems and for both cost reductions and demand reductions as explained in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 . Note that there are interesting combinatorial structures of the allowable subsets beyond paths in a graph: tours (as in the traveling salesman problem), spanning trees, or Steiner trees (that frequently occur in telecommunication networks).
We differentiate between a weak and a strong form of the Braess paradox. Weak Braess paradox occurs, if for the new equilibrium (after cost and/or demand reductions), there exists a resource with strictly increased cost. For the strong Braess paradox, there must exist a player with strictly increased private cost. Note that the strong Braess paradox implies the weak, and, immunity to the weak Braess paradox implies immunity to the strong Braess paradox (but neither statement holds vice versa in general).
Weak Braess Paradox. Our first goal is to characterize the maximal combinatorial property of the set of allowable subsets of players so that there will be no weak Braess paradox, no matter what kind of continuous and nondecreasing cost functions are associated with the resources. An informal description of our main result is:
A family of set systems is immune to the weak Braess paradox if and only if every set system consists of bases of a population-specific matroid defined on the ground set of resources.
We note that matroids have a rich combinatorial structure and include, for instance, the class of games, where each player wants to allocate a spanning tree in a graph.
Technically, our first characterization rests on two new results on the sensitivity of optimal solutions minimizing a continuous, differentiable, nondecreasing and convex separable function (i.e., the Beckman potential) over a polymatroid base polytope. We show (cf. Lemma 3.2) that if cost functions are shifted downwards, the new global minimum has the property that cost values evaluated at a new optimal solution only decrease. The second sensitivity result considers demand reductions which, as we will argue, can be interpreted in terms of a decomposition of a polymatroid. More precisely, for the second sensitivity result (cf. Lemma 3.3) we consider a specific polymatroid base polytope that can be decomposed as a Minkowski sum of finite polymatroid base polyhedra. We show that by removing one polymatroid base polytope, any new optimal solution of the Beckmann potential has also decreased cost values. The connection of these two results to the Braess paradox is drawn by observing that for games with matroid structure, the problem of computing a Wardrop equilibrium can be reduced to finding a global minimum of the Beckmann potential over a sum of population-specific polymatroid base polyhedra. For this we use the fact that the rank function of a matroid is a submodular function. The two sensitivity results, thus, imply that for matroid set systems there will be no weak Braess paradox no matter what kind of cost and/or demands reductions occur. We prove the "only if" direction via exploiting the edge-vector characterization of base polytopes due to Tomizawa (see [17, Theorem 17.1 
]).
Strong Braess Paradox. Our second result gives a characterization of the occurrence of the strong Braess paradox. For this characterization we require that there is no a priori description on how the individual strategy spaces of populations interweave. 1 We say that a set system is universally immune to the strong Braess paradox, if it is immune to the strong Braess paradox no matter how the strategy spaces of populations interweave. We then obtain:
A family of non-empty set systems containing at least two set systems is universally immune to strong Braess paradox if and only if every set system consists of bases of a population-specific matroid defined on the ground set of resources.
The "if" direction follows directly from our first characterization. For the "only if" direction we proceed by contradiction. If for a game with at least two populations, there exists a population with non-matroidal set system, then we derive appropriate cost functions on the resources, demands and an embedding of the strategy spaces into resources such that the resulting game admits the strong Braess paradox.
Related Literature
The discovery of the Braess paradox has driven a considerable amount of literature in different fields of science ranging from transportation and traffic networks (cf. [7, 12, 16, 44] ), queueing networks (cf. [8, 23, 25] ), electrical and mechanical networks (cf. [9] ), computer science (cf. [10, 15, 24, 26, 39, 38, 41, 40, 40, 46] ) to economics (cf. [33, 42] ). For an overview of further works, we refer to the website maintained by Dietrich Braess [4] .
In light of this substantial body of literature it seems surprising that to date little is known regarding general characterizations of the occurrence of the Braess paradox. Steinberg and Zangwill [45] and later Dafermos and Nagurney [12] , Pas and Principio [32] and Hagstrom and Abrams [18] derived instance-dependent necessary and sufficient conditions for the Braess paradox to occur. Here, instance-dependent means that these conditions depend on the concrete demand matrix, the cost functions and the network topology used. Hence, if for a given network topology the used cost functions or demand matrices are not known a priori, these works do not offer any insight on the occurrence of the Braess paradox. This situation occurs naturally whenever a network is build from scratch (as in telecommunications or mechanical networks) or extended (as in traffic networks) and the traffic matrix and realized cost functions are not known precisely. Even if the traffic matrix can be well estimated, the cost functions are subject to changes as street improvements and construction works are continuously ongoing changing the street characteristics. In such cases, it would be valuable to characterize networks that are not vulnerable to Braess paradox for any instantiation of the demand matrix and the cost functions. Milchtaich [28] derived such a characterization by showing that for undirected single o-d networks, series-parallel graphs form the maximal graph class that is immune to the (strong) Braess paradox no matter how many commuters travel and what kind of (continuous and nondecreasing) cost function is used. Note that series-parallel networks are precisely the class of networks that do not contain the network in Fig. 1 as a topological minor. He further proved that any undirected single o-d graph that is not series-parallel can be equipped with carefully chosen costs and demands so that the resulting instance admits the strong Braess paradox. His result, thus, provides a characterization of undirected single o-d graph topologies that are immune to the strong Braess paradox. 2 Some remarks are in order to explain how our work differs from that of Milchtaich [28] . As explained above, Milchtaich considered undirected single o-d networks and characterizes the maximal network topology that is immune to the strong Braess paradox. In particular, this implies that the resources form an undirected graph, the strategy spaces of players are symmetric as the strategies are the set of o-d paths. In contrast, we consider (general) nonatomic congestion games with asymmetric strategy spaces, where for a player the allowable set of subsets of resources can have any combinatorial structure. Interesting cases beyond o-d paths in an undirected graph include multi-commodity routing, tours, trees, or Steiner trees all in a directed or undirected graph. Additionally, we consider the more general case of cost and/or demand reductions that might increase the equilibrium cost.
For our characterization of the strong Braess paradox, there is one important additional difference to the result of Milchtaich. In contrast to Milchtaich's characterization, we do not prescribe a priori how the sets of allowable subsets of players are actually embedded in the ground set of resources, or said differently, how the strategy spaces interweave.
It is fair to say that matroids play a special role in the wide area of (integral) congestion games. This connection was first discovered by Ackermann, Rögling and Vöcking in the important papers [1, 2] . In [2] , they showed that both weighted and player-specific congestion games admit (pure Nash) equilibria in the case of matroid congestion games, i.e., if the strategy space of each player consists of the bases of a matroid on the set of resources. They also showed that the matroid property is maximal in the sense that whenever there are two players both having allowable sets of resources that are not matroidal, then, there is a prescribed embedding of the sets into the ground set of resources and cost functions so that the resulting game does not have an equilibrium. It should be noted that our characterization of the weak Braess paradox is direct (relying on a polyhedral combinatorics point of view) and does not rely on the flexibility of embeddings. Also the "only if" direction of our characterization of the strong Braess paradox exhibits a difference to that used in [2] . In [2] for obtaining counter examples it is required that the strategy space of all players are non-matroidal, whereas we only require that at least one player (or population in our setting) has a non-matroid set system, thus, allowing for a characterization.
Harks and Peis [20] considered a variant of congestion games, namely resource buying games, in which players jointly design a resource infrastructure and share the congestiondependent costs of the resources arbitrarily. We showed that for marginally non-increasing cost functions such resource buying games always admit an equilibrium as long as the players' strategy spaces form the base set of a matroid, while for non-matroid set systems, there is a two-player game with marginally non-increasing costs that does not admit an equilibrium. Finally, Harks et al. [19] showed that integral-splittable congestion games with semi-convex cost functions always admit an equilibrium whenever each player's strategy space forms an integral polymatroid.
Nonatomic Congestion Games
. . , n} is a non-empty, finite set of populations and E = {e 1 , . . . , e m } is a non-empty, finite set of resources. Players are infinitesimally small, and each population i consists of a continuum of players represented by the interval [0, d i ] for some d i > 0. For each population i ∈ N , the set S i is a non-empty, finite set of subsets S ⊆ E available to each player of population i. Each player selects a strategy S ∈ S i , which leads to a strategy distribution (x S ) S∈S i satisfying S∈S i x S = d i and x S ≥ 0 (∀S ∈ S i ). We denote by S the collection of all strategies of all players. The set S is a multiset since whenever a set is a feasible strategy for more than one player, the set occurs multiple times in S. After each player has chosen a strategy, we arrive at the overall strategy distribution x = (x S ) S∈S . The induced load of x on e is denoted by x e = S∈S:e∈S x S (assuming every strategy S ∈ S contains each resource at most once and that for every i ∈ N , the rate of consumption of every S ∈ S i on resource e ∈ S is equal to one). Thus, we can compactly represent the set of feasible strategy distributions by the following polytope
We denote by x i,e = S∈S i :e∈S x S the load of population i on resource e. Hence, x e = i∈N x i,e . For every resource e ∈ E, there is a cost function c e : R ≥0 → R ≥0 which is assumed to be non-negative, continuous and nondecreasing. If in strategy distribution x, a player of population i selects S ∈ S i , she perceives the disutility, or private cost, of
Since we are often interested in the load on the resources, we define for every polytope P (M) ⊆ R S ≥0 of feasible strategy distributions, a corresponding polytopeP (M) ⊆ R E ≥0 that captures all possible load vectors on the resources obtained by playing a feasible strategy distribution, i.e.,P
where χ S ∈ {0, 1} E for S ⊆ E is the characteristic vector of S; hence, χ S (e) = 1 if e ∈ S and χ S (e) = 0 if e ∈ E \ S.
Nonatomic Matroid Congestion Games
A matroid is a tuple M = (E, I), where E is a finite set, called the ground set, and I ⊆ 2 E is a nonempty family of subsets of E, called independent sets, such that: (i) if X ∈ I and Y ⊆ X, then Y ∈ I, and (ii) if X, Y ∈ I with |X| > |Y |, then ∃ e ∈ X \ Y such that Y ∪ {e} ∈ I. The inclusionwise maximal independent sets of I are called bases of matroid M , and usually denoted by B, or B(M ). See [31, 48, 43] for more information on matroids.
A nonatomic congestion model M is called matroid congestion model if for every i ∈ N there is a matroid M i = (E, I i ) such that S i equals the set of bases of M i . In case of nonatomic matroid congestion games we will write B i instead of S i , B i instead of S i and B instead of S. We give three examples in the area of queueing, facility location and minimum spanning tree games.
Example 2.1 (Queueing Games (cf. [25])).
There is a set Q = {q 1 , . . . , q m } of M/M/1 queues served in a first-come-first-served fashion and a set of N = {1, . . . , n} independent Poisson arrivals of packets, where the arrival rates are denoted by d 1 , . . . , d n . Every queue q has a single server with exponentially distributed service time with mean 1/µ q , µ q > 0. Each packet is routed to a single queue q out of a set of allowable queues depending on the type. Given a distribution of packets x ∈ R m ≥0 , the mean delay of queue q can be computed as c q (x q ) = 1 µq−xq . Also in this case, the sets S i , i ∈ N, are uniform rank-1 matroids.
Example 2.2 (Facility location games with supply functions).
Matroid congestion games can also be used as a modeling tool for resource buying games with supply functions. More precisely, whereas so far we interpreted the cost of a resource mostly in terms of a "disutility" like congestion, one can as well interpret costs as actual renting or buying costs of a resource that depend on the demand, i.e., the more users use a resource, the higher its price. We provide an example phrased in the context of facility location, though the described approach also applies to further settings. Consider a finite set E = {e 1 , . . . , e m } of resources in different locations, and a set of populations N = {1, . . . , n}. The resources could for example correspond to data centers, and the players have to decide which data centers to use to serve their clients. A population groups together players that want to serve clients within the same areas. Each player in population i ∈ N -where, as usual, we assume that there is a total "mass" of d i players in population i-desires to use some number k i ∈ Z >0 of different data centers, to cover k i different areas. Each area j can be served by any data center within a given set S j ⊆ E. The sets S j may overlap, even for the same player i. However, due to reliability reasons, a player cannot use the same data center more than once. Furthermore, to model an offer/demand interplay, the cost c e for using a particular data center e ∈ E depends on the total load of players who use data center e. The higher the load on a data center, the larger the cost to use it. In this setting, the strategy space of each population i ∈ N corresponds to a transversal matroid described by the sets S j for all areas j that population i wants to serve. Thus, this problem can be modeled as a matroid congestion game.
Example 2.3 (MST Games
). We are given an undirected graph G = (V, E) with nonnegative, continuous and non-decreasing edge cost functions c e (ℓ), e ∈ E. In a minimum spanning tree (MST) game, every population i is associated with a demand interval [0, d i ] and a subgraph G i of G. A strategy distribution for population i is to route its demand along the spanning trees of G i . Formally, the edges correspond to the resources and the sets S i , i ∈ N , are the spanning trees of G i . M i is called a graphic matroid.
Wardrop Equilibria
We recall the following characterization of Wardrop equilibria which implies their existence. (1)
We call Φ the Beckmann potential.
Notice that the problem of finding the minimum value of the Beckmann potential can equivalently be written in terms ofP (M) as the following minimization problem:
Later in our results, we will often refer to this equivalent version of the problem of minimizing the Beckmann potential. For simplicity, we will use Φ(x) also for the Beckmann potential for points x ∈P (M).
Remark 2.5. Using that every Wardrop equilibrium x ∈P (M) is a global minimum of (1) we obtain the following well-known properties (cf. [11] ). If cost functions (c e ) e∈E are strictly increasing, the Wardrop equilibrium x is unique (but there can be different decompositions of the demands among the subsets). For the case of nondecreasing costs, the vector of costs (c e (x e )) e∈E is unique under the possibly non-unique equilibria.
The Braess Paradox
Recall the examples of Braess paradox presented in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 . In these examples, the equilibrium flow on two (network) congestion models M andM are compared to each other, whereM is related to M by simply reducing some of the cost functions (in case of the example in Fig. 1 , only one cost function is reduced from ∞ to 0) and/or reducing the demands of the populations.
In this work, we allow for general cost reductions of the formc e (t) ≤ c e (t) for all t ≥ 0 and e ∈ E and general demand reductionsd i ≤ d i , i ∈ N . We denote the changed model bȳ M. Note that for both models M andM, the sets of allowable subsets (S i ) i∈N remain the same. We define the following notion of the weak and strong Braess paradox. 
there is e ∈ E with c e (x) >c e (x e ).
(weak BP) (S i ) i∈N admits the strong Braess paradox, if there is i ∈ N with S,
We say that (S i ) i∈N is immune to the weak/strong Braess paradox, if no such M,M exist.
Remark 2.7. The strong Braess paradox implies the weak, but not vice versa. On the other hand, if a set system (S i ) i∈N is immune to the weak Braess paradox, it is also immune to the strong Braess paradox. Moreover, if (S i ) i∈N satisfies that for every resource e ∈ E, there is a player i with S i = {e}, then, weak and strong Braess paradox are equivalent.
The examples in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 already show that there are quite simple set systems (S i ) i∈N that admit the strong (and thus the weak) Braess paradox.
The driving question of this paper is the following:
What is the maximal combinatorial structure of (S i ) i∈N which is immune to the weak or strong Braess paradox?
A Characterization of the Weak Braess Paradox
Our first main result gives a complete characterization of the weak Braess paradox. Theorem 3.1. Let (S i ) i∈N be a family of set systems. Then, the following statements are equivalent.
(I) (S i ) i∈N consists of bases of a matroid M i = (E, I i ), i ∈ N .
(II) (S i ) i∈N is immune to the weak Braess paradox.
Proof of Theorem 3.1: (I) ⇒ (II)
The proof of (I) ⇒ (II) consists of a number of steps organized as follows. The first step is to model the set of feasible strategy distributions of a nonatomic matroid congestion game via a suitably defined polymatroid base polytope. This way, the problem of computing a Wardrop equilibrium of a matroid congestion model can be interpreted as the problem to find a global minimum of a separable convex function (i.e., the Beckman potential) over a sum of population-specific polymatroid base polytopes which itself is a polymatroid base polytope (see [13] ).
In the next step, we prove two sensitivity results for this class of optimization problems stating that whenever (i) cost functions or (ii) demands are decreased, any global minimizer of the Beckmann potential has the property that the new induced cost values component-wise decrease. This implies that the weak Braess paradox does not occur.
Polymatroids. In order to define polymatroids we first have to introduce submodular functions. A function
for all U ⊆ V , and normalized if h(∅) = 0. Given a submodular, monotone and normalized function h, the pair (E, h) is called a polymatroid. The associated polymatroid base polytope is defined as
where x(U ) := e∈U x e for all U ⊆ E. Given submodular functions h i , i ∈ N all defined on 2 E and h := i∈N h i , we know that the Minkowski sum P h = i∈N P h i is also a polymatroid base polytope, see [13] , [17] , or [43, Theorem 44.6] .
From Nonatomic Matroid Congestion Games to Polymatroids. Consider now a nonatomic matroid congestion model M, where for every i ∈ N the associated strategy space forms the base set B i of a matroid M i = (E, I i ). It is well-known that the rank function rk i : 2 E → R of matroid M i satisfies rk i (S) := max{|U | | U ⊆ S and U ∈ I i } ∀S ⊆ E and is submodular, monotone and normalized. Moreover, the characteristic vectors of the bases in B i are exactly the vertices of the polymatroid base polytope P rk i .
It follows that the polytope
corresponds to strategy distributions for population i that lead to load vectors in the following polytope:
Thus, the polymatroid base polytope P := i∈N P d i ·rk i = P i∈N d i ·rk i is equal toP (M). To simplify notation we define the following submodular functions: h i = d i · rk i for i ∈ N and h = i∈N h i . Furthermore, let P i = P h i . We thus haveP (M) = P h = i∈N P i .
Two Sensitivity Results. Consider the following optimization problem
where P h is a polymatroid base polyhedron with rank function h and for all e ∈ E, c e : R ≥0 → R ≥0 , are non-decreasing and continuous functions. We recall the following necessary and sufficient optimality conditions. Let χ a ∈ R E ≥0 be the indicator vector with all-zero entries except for the a-th coordinate which is 1. From Fujishige [17] we know that a base x ∈ P h is optimal for problem (2) if and only if c e (x e ) ≤ c f (x f ) for all e, f ∈ E, x e > 0 with x ′ := x + ǫ(χ f − χ e ) ∈ P h for some ǫ > 0. (3) We now prove a result on the sensitivity of optimal solutions minimizing the Beckmann potential over a polymatroid base polytope: we will show that whenever a cost function is shifted downwards (i.e.,c e (t) ≤ c e (t) for all t ≥ 0), then, any new optimal solutionx has the propertyx e ≤ x e for all e ∈ E, where x denotes any optimal solution for the cost functions c e , e ∈ E, andx denotes any optimal solution for the cost functionsc e , e ∈ E. This result implies that for matroid set systems the weak Braess paradox does not occur if only cost reductions are considered.
Lemma 3.2. Let I andĪ be two instances of problem (2) with the only difference that for I we use cost functions satisfyingc e (t) ≤ c e (t) for all e ∈ E and t ≥ 0. Then, any optimal solutions x andx to the instances I andĪ, respectively, satisfȳ c e (x e ) ≤ c e (x e ), for all e ∈ E.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. Assume by contradiction that there is e ∈ E withc e (x e ) > c e (x e ). Thus, by the monotonicity of c e this impliesx e > x e . By elementary transformations of bases in polymatroid base polyhedra (see Murota [30, Theorem 4.3] ), there must exist f ∈ E \ {e} withx f < x f and ǫ > 0 such that
As x andx are both optimal solutions for their respective optimization problems, and x f ,x e > 0, we obtain by the optimality conditions (3) that c f (x f ) ≤ c e (x e ) andc e (x e ) ≤c f (x f ). Hence,
We now prove a second sensitivity result for minimizers of the Beckman function over the polymatroid base polytope for the case when the demand is reduced. Lemma 3.3. Let I andĪ be two instances of problem (2), with the only difference that forĪ the demand for one player j ∈ N is decreased from d j tod j < d j . Hence, the feasible strategy distributions P andP of I andĪ, respectively, are given by P = P h = i∈N P i , and
Let x,x ∈ R E + be minimizers of problem (2) over the polytopes P andP , respectively. Then c e (x e ) ≤ c e (x e ) ∀e ∈ E.
Proof of Lemma 3.3. By contradiction assume there is e ∈ E with c e (x e ) > c e (x e ). Since c e is nondecreasing, this impliesx e > x e . Because x ∈ P = i∈N P i , we can decompose x as x = i∈N x i where x i ∈ P i for i ∈ N . Let x ′ = i∈N \{j} x i +d j d j x j ∈P . Clearly, x ′ ≤ x component-wise, and we thus have in particularx e > x e ≥ x ′ e . By exchange properties of base polytopes of polymatroids there exists f ∈ E with x f < x ′ f , and (4) there is ǫ > 0 such that
Together with (ii) this implies
and therefore c e (x e ) ≥ c f (x f ),
since x is a minimizer of Ψ over P . Similarly, (i) implies
becausex is a minimizer of Ψ overP . Putting things together, we obtain c e (x e ) < c e (x e ) (by assumption for sake of contradiction)
( (4) and c f is nondecreasing)
, thus leading to a contradiction and finishing the proof.
Furthermore, Lemma 3.2 shows that equilibrium costs only decrease (component-wise) when reducing the cost function. Hence, reducing costs and demands simultaneously can be interpreted as doing first one reduction and then the other. Each of these changes is such that any new Wardrop equilibrium has on any resource a lower cost than before the change. Thus, matroid set systems (as a special case of polymatroids) are immune to the weak Braess paradox.
Proof of Theorem 3.1: (II) ⇒ (I)
Let us restate the definition of a set system being immune to the weak Braess paradox. Let M andM be any two models of a nonatomic congestion game with the only difference that forM we use cost functions satisfyingc e (t) ≤ c e (t) for all e ∈ E and t ≥ 0 andd i ≤ d i for all i ∈ N . Then, Wardrop equilibria x andx for M andM, respectively, satisfȳ c e (x e ) ≤ c e (x e ), for all e ∈ E.
We give a proof of the direction (II) ⇒ (I) from a combinatorial polyhedral point of view. The statement is implied by the following result.
Theorem 3.4. For each i ∈ N , let S i be a family of pairwise non-comparable subsets of E (i.e., a clutter). Then, (S i ) i∈N is immune to the weak Braess paradox, only if S i (i ∈ N ) are matroid base families.
(Note that we can assume w.l.o.g. that each set system S i forms a clutter (in the sense that X ∈ S i , X ⊂ Y implies Y ∈ S i ) for the following reason: due to the non-negative cost functions, a player of population i would never have an incentive to switch her strategy to a superset of her chosen one.)
Define polytopes
where χ S denotes the characteristic vector of S ⊆ E, and let P be the Minkowski sum of P i multiplied by d i for all i ∈ N , i.e.,
Fact 1: Every edge vector of P i for i ∈ N is of form χ S − χ T for some S, T ∈ S i .
Fact 2: Every edge vector of P is an edge vector of some P i for i ∈ N . Conversely, for all i ∈ N every edge vector of P i is an edge vector of P .
We see from Fact 1 and Fact 2 the following lemma.
Lemma 3.5. The direction vector of any edge uv of P is given by χ S − χ T for some S, T ∈ S i and i ∈ N .
Let uv be an arbitrary edge of P and x 0 be a point within the relative interior of edge uv.
Lemma 3.6. Suppose that we have a supporting hyperplane h, x = a of P such that it defines the edge uv and satisfies h, x ≥ a for all x ∈ P and that h is a positive vector in R E . Then there exists a Beckmann potential
such that each C ′ e (the derivative c e of C e ) is continuous and increasing and Φ has x 0 as its unique minimizer.
Proof. For any p > 0 consider a separable strictly convex function of the form
Note that Φ(0) = 0. Since h is a positive vector, we can easily see that for a sufficiently small p > 0 the function Φ(x) is a desired Beckmann potential in the present lemma.
For any t ∈ T \ S and α > 0 definē
whereC (t,α) e = C e for each e ∈ E \ {t} andC
. Then we can easily show the following lemma. The gradient of Φ is denoted by ∇Φ.
Lemma 3.7. Under the same assumption as in Lemma 3.6, for a sufficiently small α > 0 there exists β > 0 such that y = x 0 + β(χ S − χ T ) minimizesΦ (t,α) defined by (12) and is within the relative interior of uv.
Proof. Since x 0 is a unique minimizer of Φ lying on the relative interior of edge uv, along the direction of edge uv we have
and there exists a positive ε such that for any direction d of unit length from x 0 toward within P and orthogonal to edge uv we have
Also, consider forΦ (t,α) and β ∈ R
Since C ′ e s are continuous and increasing, it follows from (13) that if α(> 0) is sufficiently small, there exists a β > 0 such that the value of (15) is equal to zero and the point x 0 + β(χ S − χ T ) lies within the relative interior of edge uv. For such α and β put y = x 0 +β(χ S −χ T ). Because of (14), choosing α > 0 sufficiently small, y is the minimizer ofΦ (t,α) satisfying the required properties of the present lemma.
Lemma 3.8. Suppose that (S i ) i∈N is immune to the weak Braess paradox. Then, under the same assumption as in Lemma 3.6 the direction vector of edge uv is of form χ e − χ e ′ for some distinct e, e ′ ∈ E.
Proof. Consider α, β, and y given in Lemma 3.7. It follows from Lemma 3.7 that for some
Since C ′ e (γ) ≤C (t,α) e ′ (γ) for all e ∈ E and γ ≥ 0 and the present system (S i ) i∈N is assumed to be immune to the weak Braess paradox, i.e., satisfy (7), we have
Since C ′ e =C (t,α) e ′ for all e ∈ E \ {t} and C (t,α) e ′ (γ)s are increasing in γ, we get
Since x 0 = y and S i is a clutter, we have from (16) and (18) T \ S = {t}.
Moreover, because of the symmetry between S and T we also have
for some s ∈ E. We see from (16), (19) , and (20) that the edge direction y − x 0 is proportional to χ s − χ t .
Proof of Theorem 3.4. Let x * be an arbitrary extreme point of P . Then by the definition of P there exist extreme points w i of P i for all i ∈ N such that
Here, each w i is equal to χ S i for some S i ∈ S i and S i is a clutter, point w i is (component-wise) minimal in P i . Hence x * given by (21) is also a minimal vector in P . Since the set of all minimal vectors in P is given by the union of some faces Q j (j ∈ J) of P , x * is an extreme point of Q j 0 for some j 0 ∈ J and an edge uv of Q j 0 incident to x * satisfies the assumption of Lemma 3.6. Note that the set of all minimal vectors in P is connected. It follows from Lemma 3.8 that the set of all the extreme points of P is linked (connected) by edges of P having edge direction vectors of form χ e − χ e ′ for distinct e, e ′ ∈ E. This means that all the extreme points of P lie on a hyperplane x(E) = a for some a > 0, which thus includes P . Hence every edge of P satisfies the assumption of Lemma 3.6 and has an edge direction vector of form χ e − χ e ′ for distinct e, e ′ ∈ E, due to Lemma 3.8.
Consequently, because of the edge vector characterization of (poly)matroid base polytopes (see [17, Theorem 17 .1]), we conclude that S i (i ∈ N ) are matroid base families.
The Strong Braess Paradox for Non-Matroid Set Systems
We now investigate the maximal combinatorial property of the set systems so that the strong Braess paradox does not occur. In contrast to the weak Braess paradox, the matroid property is not necessary for immunity against the strong Braess paradox. Milchtaich [28] , for example, shows that if the strategy space of every player is symmetric and corresponds to the paths of a series-parallel s-t graph, then there will be no strong Braess paradox. Note that in this case the resulting set systems need not be bases of matroids.
In this section, we derive a characterization of the strong Braess paradox that does not take into account the global structure of the game. Specifically, we show that the matroid property is the maximal condition on the players' strategy spaces that guarantees that the strong Braess paradox does not occur without taking into account how the strategy spaces of different players interweave (cf. Ackermann, Rögling and Vöcking [1, 2] who introduced the notion of interweaving of strategy spaces). To state this property mathematically precisely, we introduce the notion of embeddings of S i in E. Formally, an embedding is a map τ := (τ i ) i∈N , where every τ i : E i → E is an injective map from E i := ∪ S∈S i S to E. The embedding of S i in E according to τ is then defined by identifying every S = {e 1 , . . . , e k } ∈ S i with τ i (S) := {τ i (e 1 ), . . . , τ i (e k )} and τ (S i ) := {τ i (S)|S ∈ S i }. Given (S i ) i∈N and τ , the new combined strategy space is then denoted by (τ i (S i )) i∈N . Definition 4.1. A family of set systems S i ⊆ 2 E , i ∈ N is said to be universally immune to the strong Braess paradox if for all embeddings τ in E, the set system (τ i (S i )) i∈N does not admit the strong Braess paradox (in the sense of Definition 2.6).
Since any embedding of the set of bases of a matroid into a ground set of resource is a set of bases of a matroid again, we obtain the following immediate consequence of Theorem 3.1.
Corollary 4.2. If (S i ) i∈N consists of bases of a matroid M i = (E, I i ), i ∈ N , then (S i ) i∈N is universally immune to the strong Braess paradox.
Our second result now gives a complete characterization of set systems that are universally immune to the strong Braess paradox. We prove (III) ⇒ (I) by contradiction. Consider a family of non-empty set systems (S i ) i∈N , with S i ⊆ 2 E i , i ∈ N and n := |N | ≥ 2, and assume that at least one set system, say S 1 , is not the base set of a matroid. We will show that family (S i ) i∈N admits embeddings τ i : E i → E, i ∈ N , such that τ (S) = (τ 1 (S 1 ), . . . , τ n (S n )) admits the strong Braess paradox.
As argued before we can assume w.l.o.g. that each set system S i forms an anti-chain (in the sense X ∈ S i , X ⊂ Y implies Y ∈ S i ). Let us call a non-empty set system S i ⊆ 2 E i a non-matroid if S i is an anti-chain and (E i , {X ⊆ S : S ∈ S i }) is not a matroid.
Our proof relies on a certain property of non-matroids stated in the following Lemma. Its proof can also be derived from the proof of Lemma 5.1 in [20] , or the proof of Lemma 16 in [2] .
Lemma 4.4. If S i ⊆ 2 E i with S i = ∅ is a non-matroid, then there exist X, Y ∈ S i and {a, b, c}
Proof of Lemma 4.4. Recall the basis exchange property for matroids: an anti-chain B ⊆ 2 E i is the family of bases of some matroid if and only if for any X, Y ∈ B and e ∈ X \ Y there exists some f ∈ Y \ X such that X − e + f ∈ B. Thus, if the anti-chain S i ⊆ 2 E i is a non-matroid, there must exist X, Y ∈ S i and e ∈ X \ Y such that for all f ∈ Y \ X the set X − e + f does not belong to S i . We choose such X, Y and e ∈ X \ Y with |Y \ X| minimal (among all Y ′ ∈ S with X − e + f ′ ∈ S i for all y ′ ∈ Y ′ \ X). Note that |Y \ X| ≥ 1, since S i is an anti-chain. We distinguish the two cases |Y \ X| = 1 and |Y \ X| > 1: In case |Y \ X| = 1, set {a} = Y \ X and choose any two distinct elements {b, c} ∈ X \ Y . Note that |X \ Y | ≥ 2 as otherwise, if X \ Y = {e}, then Y = X − e + a, in contradiction to our assumption. Now, for any set Z ⊆ (X ∪ Y ) − a with Z ∈ S, the anti-chain property implies Z = X, and therefore {b, c} ⊆ Z, as desired.
In the latter case |Y \ X| > 1, we choose any two distinct elements {b, c} ∈ Y \ X and set a = e. Consider any Z ∈ S with Z ⊆ (X ∪ Y ) − a and suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that {b, c} ⊆ Z. Since Z \ X ⊆ Y \ X, there cannot exist some g ∈ Z \ X with X − a + g ∈ S. However, |Z \ X| < |Y \ X| in contradiction to our choice of Y .
Using this property of non-matroids, we now define embeddings τ (S) = (τ 1 (S 1 ), . . . , τ n (S n )) that admit the strong Braess paradox. The rough idea can be described as follows: we choose the embeddings, demands, and cost-functions in such a way that the first two populations are independent of the remaining populations, and such that the game of the first two populations is isomorphic to the routing game illustrated in Figure 3 which admits the strong Braess paradox. Figure 3 : There are two populations 1 and 2 that want to send 1/2 units of demand each from s 1 and s 2 , respectively, to t. In the left network there is a unique Wardrop equilibrium, where each population uses their direct edge leading to a cost of 1 for every agent of population 1 and a cost of 1/2 for the agents of population 2. Decreasing the cost from 3 to 0 for the arc (s 1 , s 2 ) induces now the unique Wardrop equilibrium, where agents of population 1 now choose the path (s 1 , s 2 , t).
Let us define the embeddings such that τ i (E i )∩(τ 1 (E 1 )∪τ 2 (E 2 )) = ∅ for all i ∈ N \{1, 2} in order to guarantee that the game of the first two populations is independent of the remaining populations. LetẼ = i∈N τ i (E i ) denote the set of all resources under the embeddings τ i , i ∈ N . The costs on all resources inẼ \ (τ 1 (E 1 ) ∪ τ 2 (E 2 )) are set to zero. Also, the demands of all populations d i with i ∈ N \ {1, 2} are set to zero. This way, the game is basically determined by the players in populations 1 and 2. We set the demands d 1 = d 2 = 1 2 . Let us choose two sets X, Y in S 1 and {a, b, c} ⊆ X ∪ Y as described in Lemma 4.4. Let e := τ 1 (a), f := τ 1 (b) and g := τ 1 (c) with load-dependent costs c e (t) = 1, c f (t) = t and c g (t) = 3 for any t ∈ R ≥0 . We set the costs of all resources in τ 1 (E 1 ) \ (τ 1 (X) ∪ τ 1 (Y )) to some very large cost M (large enough so that no player of population 1 would ever use any of these resources). The cost on all resources in (τ 1 (X) ∪ τ 1 (Y )) \ {e, f, g} is set to zero. This way, each player of population 1 always chooses a strategy τ 1 (Z) ⊆ τ 1 (X) ∪ τ 1 (Y ) which, by Lemma 4.4, either contains e, or it contains both f and g.
In order to guarantee that each player of population 2 always selects a strategy containing f , we select a set S ∈ S 2 of minimal cardinality, and some arbitrary resource k ∈ S, and define the embedding τ 2 such that τ 2 (k) = f and τ 1 (E 1 ) ∩ τ 2 (E 2 ) = {f }. We set the resource costs such that c r (x) = 2 for all resources r ∈ τ 2 (E 2 ) \ {f }.
Note that the game of population 1 and 2 is basically isomorphic to the routing game illustrated by the left network in Figure 3 if we interpret resource e as arc (s 1 , t), resource f as arc (s 2 , t), and resource g as arc (s 1 , s 2 ). By the choice of our cost functions, each player of population 2 always selects the "direct connection", i.e., a strategy containing f , but neither e nor g. As long as the cost on g := (s 1 , s 2 ) is 3 (like in the left network), each player of population 1 selects the "direct connection", i.e., a strategy containing e, but neither f nor g. However, if the cost on g is reduced from 3 down to zero (like in the right network in Figure  3 ), each player selects the seemingly cheaper strategy containing both, f and g, but not e (the "indirect connection"), resulting in a Wardrop equilibrium in which each player of population 2 pays twice as much as in the Wardrop equilibrium for the left network, i.e., before the costs have been reduced. Note that the entire construction only involved cost reductions.
Remark 4.5. We can also characterize the universally strong Braess paradox for the case where only demand reductions are considered. We use Lemma 4.4 to construct a game that is isomorphic to the instance presented in Fig. 2 . Note that in this instance we have two "trivial" players having one resource each, thus, we need at least three populations.
